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ABSTRACT 
Convergence and increased complexity has made tracking components and inventory,          
especially high value or security risks an increasingly large scale, distributed challenge for:             
federal, state, and local government agencies, industries, municipal operations centers (airports,           
docks, etc.) and other large public concerns. Lifecycle management includes component stress            
analysis and overall health. The methods hereby address the detection, identification and            
integrity of movable components in a tamper-proof manner. The selection of radioactive            
materials, radioactive lifecycle, their density and material insertion, and uniformity in insertion            
during manufacturing determine the type process in identification. A receiver sensor may be             
built upon geiger counter methods which are widely available technologies. The receivers will             
display heatmaps of the radiation distribution or trigger configured notifications when the            
radioactive waves as within proximity sensors with sufficient range and fidelity to make detection              
and tracking economical. 
BACKGROUND 
NASA has launched in 2002 the Engineering for Complex Program (ECS) as a             
subsequent result from the investigation of Columbia Shuttle Accident. Investigation for defect            
detection became top priority for the agency. Many of novels ideas were investigated and              
developed during the Engineering for Complex Systems program (ECS). The program           
conducted research and development for all engineering lifecycle phases with enhancements in            
risk management and health diagnostics assessments. During that process requirements were           
gathered that helped formulate the current “Components Identifications and Diagnostics With           
Active Radiation” work. The ECS R&D efforts had broad applicability including aeronautics,            
military and commercial aviation manufacturing. In particular vehicle manufacturers are          
challenged to track millions of components to help the prevention of parts or components of               
being lost, stolen, or counterfeited. Although tagging technologies such as RFID have been             
developed that technology still has key weaknesses in robustness and integrity control. 
  
The goal of ECS program was to deliver strategic state-of-the-art advances in risk             
analysis and mitigation for for all of NASA missions including real time/run-time beyond ground              
operations health management and diagnostics. The following section below delivers on some            
of the originating concepts.  
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DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVE 
Tracking globally distributed components is a significant challenge for many          
organizations and government agencies including commercial industry, federal, state         
government, port authorities and the general public. Full lifecycle tracking of high value and/or              
risk items is important to to maintain safety, security, and to reduce the potential for loss,                
integrity degradation and to help prevent/identify counterfeits. Shortfalls in this capability for            
complex and convergent components and systems have global economic impacts. An example            
problem is when a stolen aircraft is sold on the black market for parts and there is no way to                    
track the parts beyond basic visual inspection. An efficient, low cost, reliable method is required               
to deal with this type of problems. 
  
The same issue is prevalent today with firearms and public safety. Quick, low cost,              
reliable methods are required to identify the presence of firearms in public locations to enable               
the authorities to detect their presence and validate their authorization to be present. The              
objective to solve for the identification and tracking and a component, tamper-proof, and             
specially for transit mode when a guns are getting in proximity of prohibited zone such as a                 
school or a church or ports. Lastly, materials failure from stress such as engine, turbine, space                
vehicle heat shields can be analysed in real time for stress or fracture with differential analysis                
and comparison of the radiating waves from baselines. 
  
The proximity use cases in the state of the art in current industry relies on addon tagging                 
technology; with the proximity sensors has to be near the object. Tagging technology is NOT               
tamper-proof.  
TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTION 
The methods hereby address the detection and identification, and diagnostics of           
movable components in a tamper-proof manner. Primarily intended for metal based (e.g. steel             
or other metals) components, the methods assert that components are either tainted, mixed             
while in the mold, or specially painted with radioactive materials. The selection of radioactive              
materials, density wave types, and uniformity in manufacturing determine the type process in             
the identification and analysis. Radioactivity emit different type of radiations waves, and some of              
these radiations type may penetrate the protective gear, walls or other obstacles. A receiver              
sensor is built on geiger counter methods, a widely available technologies. The receiver will              
generate heat map and/or trigger configured notifications when the radioactive waves as a             
proximity sensors. 
  
There is a natural and difficult boundary to tamper with the removal of the radioactive               
materials without total destruction. The radioactive active materials should be infused at the             
appropriate concentration levels for public safety and hazard minimums to meet users/public            
expected exposure requirements. There are many types of radioactive materials that meet            
public safety requirements. Many of these radioactive materials also have a long decay lives              
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that exceed by many times the expected viable lifetimes of the components (i.e in centuries) in                
question. 
  
A first example is to consider when a lightweight gun’s barrel is mixed with radioactive               
materials and a geiger counter receiver sensor device is carried by a law enforcement agent.               
When an individual carrying the radioactive gun enters the region of proximity of the geiger               
counter, the sensor picks up the radiation wave and issues a notification signal consisting of               
strength levels. Given multiple sensors available on the premise which can detect the radiation,              
simple methods of triangulation may derive the location of the gun. This applies also to gun                
components such as the gun’s magazine and even bullets.  
 
Another example is when military equipment are manufactured and specific components           
are tainted or mixed with radioactive materials. These materials become readily detected by             
sensors. Governments supplied weapons often allocated to a wide range of third parties and              
mercenaries for sanction use. However, after the sanctioned use is over, weapons are rarely              
recovered and sold on the black market and often ending up being misused in numerous ways. 
  
The same sensors (i.e. Geiger counter) could detect radiation from a distance. Given an              
approximated distance measurement, the measure of the radiation spread and intensity value            
can be derived to compute a quantification measure in terms of size, volume or mass of the                 
target components. For example stolen weapons that have fallen in the hands of assailants can               
be tracked and assessed. Other approaches in military use case is to deploy notifications              
systems or other remedies which are put in place to respond to the detection of these                
components within a given proximity.  
 
These components type could vary across domains. In industrial use cases, they may be              
aircraft components or ground systems (tanks, artillery, vehicles and support etc.), spacecraft or             
naval components. The military use cases will vary from tracking stolen components in             
manufacturing, to detering counterfeits, to the battlefield as enhanced situational awareness.           
For the battlefield example, a fly-by drone can pick the radiation from stolen components.  
 
Materials Fracture and Stress Analysis 
The example of material stress analysis involves the process of mixing or tainting             
radioactive materials with the components that likely will undergo stress in their usage such as               
heat shields in re-entry vehicles space components etc.. The process in the manufacturing             
should guarantee the proper uniform distribution of the radioactive materials in the components.             
The manufacturing signatures of radiation profiles are measured and kept as a quality reference              
baseline. When stress, fractures, micro fractures, or other deformities occur, the radiation            
signatures will vary from the baseline reference signatures by date of production. This process              
is also valuable for automotive manufacturing such as engine heads or gears and applicable as               
well as in the aircraft industry. Engines over time endure micro fractures and eventually fail (e.g.                
blown heads). Radioactive tainting cane be used as a method of diagnostics and analysis in real                
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time or in maintenance mode. It will enable low cost analysis of the area and cross section of                  
the components which are not accessible to standard methods for analysis.  
 
Example for lightweight barreled guns in Public Safety 
The example of the proposed methods to address the lightweight guns is as follows. A               
gun shall be tainted or mixed with radioactive materials to trigger proximity sensors. The              
radioactive active materials can be infused at low concentrations to meet public safety and              
hazard regulations for long human exposures yet high enough to trigger the proximity sensors.              
The sections below describes the specific recommendations to meet the implementation of            
lightweight firearm identifications.  
 
When firearms are tainted or mixed with radioactive materials, they are readily detected             
by sensors. These sensors are positioned in the ingress and egress areas to a school or other                 
public areas where it is prohibited to have a firearm or firearm control is desired. These sensors                 
could detect radiation from the appropriate distances. Heatmaps and alarms and notifications            
systems are put in place in response to the detection of firearms in proximity.  
 
Hardware Recommendations 
In the creation of the hardware, the radioactive substance must meet certain            
requirements in order to be compatible. When choosing the part of the hardware to incorporate               
the radioactive substance into, it is important to consider the following factors: 
● Which part is crucial and cannot be removed. If the part cannot be removed, the part                
cannot be exchanged for a non-radioactive part.  
● The part becoming radioactive should also be as consistent as possible on the material              
used so that manufacturing is easier.  
● The part should also be substantial enough that adding the radioactive substance won’t             
dramatically change the integrity of the material 
○ Considering these factors, the barrel of the hardware is recommended. The           
barrel is consistent, compared to other parts of the hardware, in that it is              
commonly made of chromium molybdenum alloy steel 4140, 4150 steel, 4340           
steel, or 416 stainless steel. The barrel is the most crucial part of the hardware               
and requires a manufacturer to change. 
○ Variations to steel include other materials such as synthetic or semi-synthetic           
organic materials (e.g. plastics).  
 
Radioactive Material Requirements 
When choosing a radioactive substance, the following factors need to be considered: 
● The half-life must be long enough that the hardware will remain radioactive for an              
amount of time that warrants the cost of adding the radioactive material 
● The radioactive material must not be toxic to humans and must emit a radioactive dose               
that is less than 100 millirems a year 
● The material must have enough activity so that it can be reliably detected at reasonable               
distances 
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● The material recommended must emit gamma radiation because alpha and beta           
radiation can be shielded with a significantly smaller amount of material 
● A relatively inexpensive metal is the preferred material as the radioactive source target 
● It is also preferable that the material not be too common in everyday life so as to limit the                   
amount of false positive readings when scanning an area. 
 
Material Recommendation 
The radioactive material that meets all of the above requirements is Molybdenum 93.             
Molybdenum 93 has a half life of 4,000 years and will therefore be radioactive for a substantial                 
amount of time. The substance has a specific activity of approximately 0.934079 curies/gram             
with a decay energy of 404.78 keV​, which is enough activity in order to be detected at a                  
reasonable distance. Molybdenum 93 emits gamma radiation and is made by neutron activation             
of the stable isotope Molybdenum 92. Molybdenum is inexpensive at $30/lb but the machinery              
required for neutron activation is very expensive. However, this machinery is required to make              
almost all of the radioactive substances because almost all are synthetically made.            
Molybdenum 93 is not commonly used in industry or medicine and will therefore have very little                
background radiation. Molybdenum has other benefits such as already being used in the             
barrels of the hardware and is mined in the United States. Molybdenum is also already used in                 
alloys to add strength and corrosion resistance.  
FEATURES 
The proposed features are as follow: 
● The ability to perform fracture and stress analysis on materials and components. 
● The ability to perform fracture and stress analysis i​n real-time, run-time remotely. Ideal             
for space operation, spacecraft health analysis etc. 
● The ability to detect firearms for public safety and other designated areas using             
radioactive materials 
● The ability to efficiently and reliably detect and identify industrial and government            
components in use or in storage for the purpose of tracking.  
● The ability of identifying component for the purpose of identifying theft or counterfeits.  
● The ability of identifying component for the purpose of identifying components in the use              
in military operations. 
● Lifecycle management of components and signature of original parts and non-original           
parts in various use case including military and ground operations.  
● The type of ideal metal of steel to use. 
● The type of radioactive material to use that meets public safety.  
● Geiger counters designed for individual mobile devices for personal gun detection and            
protection. 
● Triangulations methods to detect radiation source (i.e. components) using alpha, beta           
and gamma rays as source.  
● Networked geiger apparatus mounted at optimal locations to notify detections. 
● The ability to produce telemetry from sensors parametrically in dimensions of time of              
detection, type of radiation and strength of ration.  
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SPECULATION ON PUBLIC AND COMMERCIAL IMPACT 
Given the increase large scale mass violence episodes and globalization of firearms it is              
critical that organizations and individuals in society, for public safety and security, maintain their              
right to defend themselves in sensing threats beforehand. The technology enables national            
governments or local security agencies to economically mandate and implement such           
capabilities in tamper-proof detections of high impact devices. The commoditization of these            
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